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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel secure and privacy-
preserving solution for V2X systems leveraging widely accepted
trusted computing technologies. Our approach systematically
addresses all key aspects, i.e., security, privacy and accountability
(revocation). By reflecting on state-of-the-art pseudonym archi-
tectures, we identify their limitations focusing on pseudonym re-
usage policies and revocation mechanisms. We propose the use
of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) algorithms to enhance
existing V2X security architectures. The novelty of our proposed
solution is its decentralized approach in shifting trust from
the infrastructure to vehicles. Applying DAA in V2X enables
enhanced privacy protection than is possible in current archi-
tectures through user-controlled linkability. The paper presents
the incorporation of DAA algorithms within V2X together with
rigorous security and privacy arguments.
Index Terms—Security, Privacy, Trusted Computing, Direct
Anonymous Attestation, Vehicle-2-X.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
has embraced a variety of services intended to maximize
transport efficiency and increased safety; ranging from collision
avoidance and crash notifications to traffic information and
infotainment services [1] among others. Vehicular Commu-
nications (VC) play a central role in this effort: collecting
and communicating large amounts of data among vehicles,
road-side units, humans and the surrounding environments.
In order to provide implementations for ITS, many challenges
have to be overcome with security and privacy being critical
pillars [2]; especially in the context of safety applications
where critical decisions are based on information collected by
vehicles regarding their status (e.g., position, speed, etc.) or
surrounding events (e.g., traffic jam, icy road, etc.).
Privacy requirements have been well documented in the Eu-
ropean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) TS 102
941 [3], and IEEE Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) [4] standards highlighting the following properties:
• Anonymity: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or service
without disclosing the user’s identity.
• Pseudonymity: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or
service without disclosing the user’s identity while still
being accountable for that action.
• Unlinkability: ability of a vehicle to make multiple uses
of resources or services without others being able to link
them together (i.e., infer mobility patterns).
• Unobservability: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or
service without others, especially third parties, being able
to observe that the resource or service is being used.
Over recent years, emphasis in secure ITS research has
converged on the use of Vehicular Public Key Infrastruc-
tures (VPKIs) [5] for credential management and privacy-
friendly authentication services through the use of short-
term anonymous credentials, i.e., pseudonyms. The common
denominator in such architectures is the existence of trusted
(centralized) infrastructure entities for the support of services
such as authenticated vehicle registration, pseudonym provision,
revocation, etc. While intensive research efforts have proven
the security and privacy guarantees provided in VPKIs, there
are still a number of challenges to be conquered [6] [7].
Firstly, it is essential to provide efficient, reliable and in
timely and privacy-preserving communications to all vehicles
and their embedded sensors. The reliance on infrastructure
entities within the overall architecture for such services raises
questions towards a system’s availability and scalability in
the case of a technical fault or attack. Secondly, many re-
searchers have demonstrated the privacy weaknesses of varying
pseudonym re-usage policies; even in the case of unconditional
anonymity where frequently changing pseudonyms (one per
message) has been proposed for a vehicle to avoid being
tracked, it has been shown to be ineffective due to the timing
information of changing pseudonyms [8]. Thirdly, in the context
of revocation policies for removing misbehaving nodes from
the network, this can only be achieved when the employed
pseudonym scheme supports the resolution of participants’
long-term identities from their pseudonyms [9] [10]. In this
case, information about the revocation of a vehicle’s long-
term credentials, is disseminated to other participants through
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or other means. Besides
being computationally intensive (i.e., the use of CRLs also
assumes enhanced connectivity so that all vehicles can peri-
odically retrieve any updated lists [11]), this is harmful to the
protection of their privacy [12].
If we are to fruitfully benefit from the evolution of ITS,
all aforementioned challenges need to be resolved while
taking into consideration the key technological transformations
of the automotive industry, empowered with advanced 5G
capabilities [13]. Beyond the adaptation of VC design, new
types of secure and privacy-preserving protocols are needed
to provide the envisioned level of security and privacy while
augmenting the efficiency of the current infrastructure model.
Contributions: In this paper, we propose the use of trusted
computing technologies to significantly enhance the state-of-
the-art in security and privacy of V2X. As part of this novel
decentralized approach, anonymous credentials are leveraged
through the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [14]
addressing all the aforementioned aspects and limitations,
i.e., privacy, security and accountability (revocation). More
specifically, our proposed solution (i) is scalable and de-
centralized removing the need for federated trust of the
infrastructure entities in existing V2X architectures, (ii) is
the first instance (to the best of our knowledge) that applies
the DAA algorithms to provide strong privacy protection and
user-controlled linkability without the limitations of current
pseudonym schemes, (iii) proposes simplified DAA-based
versions of pseudonym provision, management, and revocation
only requiring a limited set of infrastructure entities, and (iv)
efficiently removes misbehaving vehicles without revealing
the vehicle’s identity nor requiring the use of computationally
intensive technologies (e.g., CRLs).
Direct Anonymous Attestation is an anonymous digital
signature mechanism, where for each signature no entity can
discover the signer’s identity. However, DAA still has the
property that only a legitimate signer (e.g., vehicle) can create
a valid signature through the use of trusted computing hardware
(e.g., automotive variant of TPM [15]). Under DAA, vehicles
will be responsible for generating their own pseudonyms
resulting in simplified infrastructure models where there is
no need for a dedicated entity to take up this role, as is the
case in current VPKIs. DAA algorithms have no ability to create
pseudo-linkability between changing pseudonyms making the
revocation of misbehaving/malicious vehicles possible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
current status of vehicular communication systems is discussed
in Section II and the primitives of DAA are presented
in Section III. Section IV and V comprise the core of this work;
they give an insight to the novel DAA-based architecture, the
security and privacy-preserving services it offers along with
a detailed presentation of all implemented components and
protocols. In Section VI, we present a qualitative security
and privacy analysis of our scheme and, finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION BACKGROUND
Intensive efforts in academia, industry and standardization
bodies have spurred a number of European projects. The
E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion protected Applications (EVITA)
project [16] developed a prototype for securing in-car networks,
while the Secure Vehicle Communication (SeVeCom) [17] and
Privacy Enabled Capability in Co-operative Systems and Safety
Applications (PRECIOSA) [18] projects addressed the complex
security and privacy challenges over the wireless channel. Most
recent efforts such as the Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-X Com-
munication Systems (PRESERVE) and COmmunication Net-
work VEhicle Global Extension (CONVERGE) [19] projects
worked towards the design, implementation, and evaluation
of a complete secure and privacy-preserving subsystem that
employs a Hardware Security Module.
The aforementioned research efforts have proposed the use
of pseudonym-based schemes as the main privacy preserving
mechanism for VC [10]. The pseudonym lifecycle for existing
asymmetric pseudonym protocols follows the pattern that is
depicted in Figure 1a. The infrastructure entities in such
architectures can be broadly classified as Certification Authority
(CA), Pseudonym Provider (PP) and Revocation Authority
(RA) which are responsible for the provision of services such
as authenticated vehicle registration, pseudonym provision
and vehicle credentials revocation, respectively. In a nutshell,
the CA and PP issue long-term certificates and pseudonym
credentials (respectively) to vehicles and implement a resolution
mechanism to allow linking back pseudonyms to long-terms
IDs (VID)(Steps 1-5). During communication between vehicles,
they monitor each other’s behaviour, using misbehaviour
detection mechanisms, and may issue reports of misbehaving
vehicles to the RA (Step 9). The RA, then, makes a decision
on whether to revoke reported pseudonyms based on strong
evidence [20] [21]. In this case, the RA coordinates with the
PP, CA and Top-level CA requesting the resolution of the
given pseudonym’s long-term identifier (Steps 10-11) which is
then disseminated to other vehicles using (for example) CRLs.
However, as described in the previous section, such schemes
have been shown to suffer from scalability issues [7] [9]
and privacy weaknesses of varying pseudonym re-usage and
revocation policies [10]; especially against scenarios where the
(trusted) authorities collude with each other to link vehicles’
actions or completely de-anonymize their identity.
In contrast, our distributed DAA-based approach offers strong
security and privacy requirements without the need of a PP
since pseudonyms are now created by the vehicles themselves.
Using DAA, an in-vehicle trusted computing component (TC)
is responsible for creating an unlimited amount of trusted
pseudonym certificates without involving any infrastructure
component. The proposed approach does not require any type
of pseudonym resolution as deterministic signatures (created
only by the TC) are used for self-identification by vehicles.
In this line of research, the PUCA architecture [22] was the
first one to propose the use of anonymous credentials along with
the REWIRE [23] protocol that focused on privacy-preserving
revocation. Recent work, however, described how an adversary
can intercept a REWIRE revocation message and create a valid
confirmation that is sent and accepted by the RA. An enhanced
variant was presented in O-TOKEN [24] where an additional
key pair is embedded into pseudonym certificates that the RA
can use to verify revocation confirmations. Although these
works propose a (limited) security and privacy-oriented set of
services leveraging trusted computing technologies, in contrast
to our solution, they do not provide a comprehensive solution
addressing all key VC aspects.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF DIRECT ANONYMOUS ATTESTATION
Direct Anonymous Attestation [14] is a platform authentica-
tion mechanism that enables the provision of privacy-preserving
and accountable authentication services. DAA is based on group
signatures that give strong anonymity guarantees. The key
(a) Asymmetric Pseudonym scheme lifecycle. [10] (b) DAA Pseudonym scheme lifecycle.
Fig. 1: V2X Architectures
System Actor Data Item Description
Issuer
skI/pkI := pk(skI) DAA key pair.
pkltk/skltk Long-term key pair.
KI ECC Algorithm security parameters constructed
pkI from the issuers DAA public key and
pkltk long-term public key, hashed.
TC
DAASeed Unique secret installed at manufacture time.
cnt Counter value.
sktc := hash( DAASeed ‖ KI ‖ cnt ) Secret DAA key.
pktc := pk(sktc) Public DAA key.
skektc/pkektc := pk(skektc ) TC endorsement key pair.
skps / pkps := pk(skps) Pseudonym key pair.
Host
cre := blindSign(pktc, skI) Attestation Identity Credential.
psCerttc Pseudonym
pkps Pseudonym public key.
Verifier pkps A vehicle’s pseudonym public key.
ROGUEsktc Set of revoked TC keys.
RA skra/pkra := pk(skra) RA key pair
pkps A vehicle’s pseudonym public key RA wants to revoke.
TABLE I: DAA Security Parameters
security and privacy properties of DAA documented in [25] [26]
[27] are:
• User-controlled anonymity: Identity of user cannot be
revealed from the signature.
• User-controlled linkability: User controls whether signa-
tures can be linked.
• Non-frameability: Adversaries cannot produce signatures
originating from a valid trusted component.
• Correctness: Valid signatures are verifiable, and linkable,
where needed.
A DAA scheme considers a set of Issuers, hosts, TCs, and
verifiers; the host and TC together form a trusted platform.
The Issuer is a trusted third-party responsible for attesting
and authorizing platforms to join the network. This entity is
responsible for providing the same set of authentication services
as the CA of existing V2X security architectures (Figure 1a).
A verifier is any other system entity or trusted third-party
that can verify a platforms’ credentials in a privacy-preserving
manner using DAA algorithms; without the need of knowing
the platform’s identity. The Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)
based DAA scheme is constructed from the security parameters
defined in Table I and is comprised of five algorithms SETUP,
JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY and LINK.
In a nutshell, DAA is essentially a two-step process where,
firstly, the registration of a TC executes once and during this
phase the TC chooses a secret key (SETUP). This secret key
is stored in secure storage so that the host cannot have access
to it (as we will see in Section VI-A, we assume the possible
compromise of the hosts). Next the TC talks to the issuer
so that it can provide the necessary guarantees of its validity
(JOIN). The issuer then places a signature on the public key,
producing the Attestation Identity Credential (AIC) cre. The
second step is to use this cre for anonymous attestations on
the platform (SIGN), using Zero-Knowledge Proofs [28]. These
proofs convince a verifier that a message is signed by some
key that was certified by the issuer, without knowledge of the
TC’s DAA key or cre (VERIFY). Of course, the verifier has to
trust that the issuer only issues cres to valid TCs.
IV. MOTIVATION AND DESIGN CHOICES
Our novel DAA solution yields many advantages over state-
of-the-art asymmetric pseudonym-based V2X architectures in
terms of security, privacy and scalability. Most notably one of
the biggest advantages of such a decentralized approach is its
scalability, as trust is shifted from the back end infrastructure to
vehicles. Applying the DAA protocols results in the redundancy
(and removal) of the PP: vehicles can now create their own
pseudonyms, and DAA signatures are used to self-certify each
such credential that is verifiable by all verifiers. Furthermore,
vehicles have total control over their privacy, as no trusted
third-party is involved in the pseudonym creation phase. This
means that it is infeasible for any third-party to reveal the
identity of another vehicle assuring that pseudonym resolution
is not possible in our solution. This property also simplifies
the message exchange in the context of V2X services as Steps
3, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of Figure 1a are no longer required due to
the fact that trust is shifted to the edge points (vehicles).
Analysing the privacy requirements specified in ETSI TS
102 941 and DAA’s attributes (Sections I and III, respectively),
it is clear that all necessary properties are achieved with
the addition of security and user-controlled privacy. The
anonymity, pseudonymity and unobservability properties are
built into DAA’s algorithms, JOIN and SIGN / VERIFY by
using anonymous digital signatures. Therefore, third-parties
cannot identify and link subsequent service requests originating
from the same vehicle. This is also true in the presence of
colluding third-parties and other ITS entities. The JOIN protocol
is intentionally not privacy-preserving as the Issuer needs to be
aware of the vehicle to be authenticated. However, successful
completion of the protocol results in the vehicle solely owning
a DAA credential.
Unlinkability (and/or different levels of vehicle linkability)
is controlled by the vehicle through the DAA SIGN / VERIFY
phases (Section V-B and Section V-D). A vehicle has control
over its DAA credential, and can decide whether or not to
“blind” it, thus, producing pseudonyms (and revocation) that are
linkable. The proposed approach provides privacy-preserving
linkability via DAA deterministic signatures, where the use of
a pseudonym is unlinkable to any other pseudonyms owned
by a vehicle. This property is of particular interest to ITS
as vehicles can demonstrate unobservability and unlinkability
(when using multiple services) while being accountable for
these service invocations.
In addition, DAA also provides non-frameability and correct-
ness properties which are security attributes that ETSI standard
does not capture. DAA ensures that only valid and trustworthy
TCs are able to join the ITS by ensuring that the endorsed
TC keys have not been previously compromised. This ensures
that TCs only produce valid signatures and can only be linked
when specified by a particular authorized ITS service.
Effective revocation has been identified as a challenge [10]
due to the decentralized nature of vehicular networks and
the various pseudonym re-usage and update policies. The
revocation service in our model provides strong guarantees of
successful completion when a misbehaviour has been identified
and reported correctly using existing protocols [20, 21]. This
is mainly due to the presence of the TC who is responsible for
executing the revocation command, thus, not allowing to be
circumvented by a (compromised) vehicle. Secondly, through
the use of DAA deterministic signatures and link tokens,
revocation under changing pseudonyms is still possible and the
RA can verify revocation messages without compromising the
vehicles’ privacy. Additionally, as demonstrated in REWIRE [23]
and O-TOKEN [24], CRLs are not required. This is also true
for our architecture since the revocation mechanism triggers
the TC to delete all of its secrets, thus, not allowing any
subsequent (authorized) communication from the misbehaving
vehicle. We have to note, however, that due to the untrusted
nature of the host, it can be the case that it may not forward
the revocation message to the TC for further processing. As
we will elaborate in Section VI-B, the implementation of a
“heartbeat” mechanism (similar to the one used for monitoring
the status of one-hop vehicular topologies [29]) can provide
protection against such malevolent actions. The RA sends out
a message every cycle (which is expected to be received by
TCs), either a revocation request or a signed and timestamped
heartbeat message. TCs will take appropriate action if such
messages are not received since this might be an indication
of misbehaviour. While there is an overhead incurred by the
introduction of this mechanism, it remains substantially lower
than the current approaches that use pseudonym CRLs.
V. DAA PSEUDONYM SCHEME
Figure 1b introduces how a typical DAA pseudonym lifecycle
architecture would execute. As we can see, two trusted third-
parties are introduced; (i) the Issuer who is responsible for
authenticating vehicles through the JOIN protocol (Figure 2) and
(ii) the RA, as already exists in current architectures, that shuns
out misbehaving vehicles from the ITS. In our context, vehicles
are the combination of a host, that is a vehicular on-board
computer “normal world”, and a TC that executes in the “secure
world”; together they form the platform which we refer to from
this point onwards as the vehicle. We also have an additional
role - this of verifiers which are other ITS entities, e.g.,
another vehicle, third-party service, etc. As depicted, the use of
pseudonyms for V2X communications follows a similar pattern
as in Figure 1a, although they differ in the way pseudonyms
are introduced and revoked. There are many similarities with
the existing ITS architectures, demonstrating the feasibility of
our DAA-based solution, since with limited effort it can be
implemented in compliance with ETSI standards.
We have to highlight that our proposed solution assumes on-
board TCs that support (i) isolation: separate and protected from
the host in the event of compromise, (ii) protected execution:
ensures the operation is executed and not interfered with, and
(ii) secure storage: storage which is only accessible by the TC
if the vehicle is in a “good" state. Examples of TCs include
TPM [15], Intel SGX [30] and ARM TZ [31]. In this paper
we do not build our solution around a specific type of TC
and we leave this as an implementation detail. For the DAA-
based scheme, vehicles are required to have a TC and support
the specified functionalities. Furthermore, as an additional
implementation detail, we recommend the use of the ECC-
based DAA protocol, as this scheme is included in ISO/IEC
20008-2 2:2013 [32]. ECC is more efficient for low-end devices
which is appropriate for VCs.
Figure 2 defines the implementation of our DAA protocols.
We describe each protocol execution by defining the respon-
sibility of all system actors and separate the roles of the TC
and host. This allows us to better reason against the required
functionality of a TC. The reader is referred to Table I for
fully expanded explanations of the notations contained below.
A. Vehicle Registration
The first step for a vehicle acquiring its certificates consists
of two phases: SETUP for generation of keys and the enrollment
phase to an Issuer (JOIN). We assume that during manufacture
time, the TC will have a unique DAASeed installed, a non-
monotonic counter cnt, and the hardware will be endorsed by
the manufacturer through means of burning the endorsement
key pair: skektc / pkektc into the TC. For the SETUP phase the
JOIN: TC 
 HOST 
 ISSUER
skektc , pkektc pkektc , pktc pkektc , skI
sktc, pktc pkI
pkektc , pktc fresh nI
C C C = aenc(nI ‖ pktc, pkektc)
nI ‖ pktc nI ‖ pktc nI ‖ pktc cre = blindSign( pktc, skI )
fresh key
e = senc( cre, key )
d d, e d = aenc( key ‖ pktc, pkektc )
key ‖ pktc key store( cre )
CREATE: TC 
 HOST
sktc cre
fresh r
fresh skps/pkps "create" ‖ ĉre ĉre := blind(cre, r)
fresh r′
pssig := DAASign(pkps, r
′, sktc) = (σ1 ‖ σ2 ‖ ĉre)
σ1 := sign(pkps, sktc)
σ2 := blindSign("certified" ‖ pkps, r′, sktc)
psCerttc := (pkps ‖ pssig)
store(skps) psCerttc store(psCerttc)
SIGN / VERIFY: TC 
 HOST 
 VERIFIER
skps psCerttc pkI
mplain mplain := {|"70 mph" ‖ data |}
msign := sign(mplain, skps)
msign msg := {| mplain ‖ msign ‖ psCerttc |} msg DAAVerify(pssig, pkI)
store(pkps)
REVOKE: TC 
 HOST 
 RA
sktc, pkra cre pkI , pkps, psCerttc , skra
msg := {| "revoke" || pkps || reason |}skra
fresh r msg
verify(msg, pkra) ĉre,msg ĉre = blind(cre, r)
fresh r′
σrvk := DAASign(pkps, r, sktc) = (σ
ra
1 ‖ σra2 ‖ ĉre)
σra1 := sign(pkps, sktc)
σra2 := blindSign("confirm" ‖ pkps, r′, sktc) σrvk σrvk σrvk eq(σ1, σra1 , true)
DAAVerify(σrvk, pkI)
Fig. 2: High-level overview of the V2X DAA protocol interfaces.
issuer publishes its public key pkI and the security parameters
KI . A vehicle’s TC generates a DAA key pair: sktc / pktc
using KI , and publishes its public key pktc. The TC then
releases the public keys pkektc and pktc to the vehicle.
The details of the JOIN protocol are shown in Figure 2. By
the end of the protocol the vehicle (platform) will have acquired
a VID Certificate (cre) certifying that the vehicle has a valid
TC which has been enrolled with the Issuer via Steps 1 and 2
of Figure 1b. To initiate the JOIN protocol a vehicle sends the
Issuer its public key indicating it wants to join the network (Step
1). The Issuer responds to the vehicle with a fresh challenge C
which only the valid TC can open. The vehicle then forwards
C to its TC via a secure I/O (Step 2). The TC opens the
challenge, confirms its validity, and sends the response to the
host vehicle, which in turn, responds to the Issuer with the
recovered data items (Step 3). The Issuer verifies the received
response, confirming that the vehicle possesses a valid TC.
Following this verification, the Issuer creates the credential
cre, and a fresh symmetric session key. The credential cre,
encrypted with the session key, is sent to the vehicle, along
with an encryption of key intended for the TC, as e and d
respectively in Step 4. Finally, the vehicle uses the TC to
decrypt d, recovering the key. The TC verifies the validity of
d and then releases key to the vehicle (step 5). The vehicle
can then decrypt e (using key) to recover the certificate cre.
Finally, it verifies cre using pkI and stores it for future use.
By the end of this protocol, if successful, the vehicle is an
authenticated and legitimate member of the ITS, and ready to
register to any of the ITS’ provided services including V2X
communication.
B. Pseudonym Creation
The creation of pseudonyms (CREATE in Figure 2) lies
within the vehicles, allowing the shift of trust from a third
party to locally within the end-points. This is made possible
by all vehicles being equipped with a TC, that is responsible
for generating the pseudonyms in an environment that enables
protected execution, isolation and secure storage. From Fig-
ure 1b we focus on Step 3 of how pseudonyms are created
locally exploiting the use of the on-board TC.
Creating new pseudonyms for a vehicle does not require any
external network communication, and all message exchanges
in the CREATE protocol take place over secure I/O between the
host and TC. To initiate the creation process the host blinds the
cre with freshly generated random nonces, and sends a “create”
request to the TC with ĉre. Alternatively, the vehicle can choose
not to “blind” its credential and create pseudonyms which are
linkable. While this is bad practice, it does demonstrate that
anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability are
under the control of the vehicle. Upon receipt of the pseudonym
creation request, the TC creates a fresh pseudonym key pair
skps/pkps and fresh random r. Using the DAASign algorithm
the TC creates two signatures: σ1 - the public pseudonym key
signed with the DAA secret key sktc, and σ2 - a blind signature
of the certified pkps key; ensuring the generated pseudonyms
are not linkable. σ1 is a “link token" which is created for
the purpose of revocation, discussed in Section V-D. Once
the pseudonym signature is produced, pssig, the pseudonym
certificate, psCerttc , is produced that is constructed from the
public pseudonym key pkps and the pseudonym signature. The
TC concludes by storing the generated pseudonym secret key
skps and returns the pseudonym certificate to the host for use
in V2X communication.
By the end of this protocol a vehicle can use its pseudonyms
to communicate with the ITS’s various services, such that the
use of services are anonymous, unlinkable and unobserverable;
whilst still being held accountable for its use of the services.
C. V2X Communication
Through the use of DAA SIGN / VERIFY phases, Steps 4,
5 and 6 (from Figure 1b) are achieved by using the already
generated pseudonyms. The following protocol details how
authenticated message exchanges between ITS services and
V2X communication occurs.
To initiate a communication, the vehicle creates a safety
message that wants to broadcast to other system participants.
In our example, the vehicle creates a plain unsigned message,
mplain, stating its speed is “70 mph” and includes binary data
information. The TC is given mplain and signs it using the
current pseudonym secret key, and responds to the vehicle
with a valid signature for mplain. The vehicle then constructs
the complete message, msg, to broadcast to its surrounding
vehicles. msg is constructed from the plain message, the
message signature and the current pseudonym certificate
psCerttc . The surrounding vehicles (VERIFIER) receive msg,
and first verify that the contained psCerttc was created by a
valid TC that has been authorised by the Issuer. To achieve this
the verifying vehicle extracts pssig from the received psCerttc ,
and uses DAAVerify and the Issuers public key pkI to confirm
the pseudonym was created by a valid TC. The vehicle stores
pkps which uses it to verify that the safety message was signed.
D. Revocation
As aforementioned, one of the most critical services in an
ITS is revocation. In our protocol (REVOKE in Figure 2),
we demonstrate how this is achieved, using DAA, whilst
preserving privacy, and confirmation that the vehicle was
revoked. Revocation messages have linkable signatures to
guarantee the correct reception of a revocation command by the
vehicle in question. Prior to the execution of this protocol, we
assume a number of reports containing a misbehaving vehicle’s
pseudonym have been issued to the RA, and the decision to
revoke the vehicle has been made based on strong evidence.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that before the revocation
protocol executes, the RA has knowledge of the Issuer’s public
key pkI , the misbehaving vehicles pseudonym psCerttc and
its public key pkps.
The RA initiates the REVOKE protocol by creating a signed
revocation message msg using its secret key skra. It broadcasts
msg containing the public pseudonym key, pkps, that needs
to be revoked. All vehicles receive the revocation message
since the hosts are required to forward them to their TCs
(Section VI-B), and furthermore they generate fresh random
nonces and blind the credential producing ĉre which is again
forwarded to their TCs. The TC recognises this message as
a revocation request, and verifies that the pseudonym public
key was generated by the TC and prepares to respond to
the RA. The TC generates some fresh random r, and uses
the DAASign algorithm to produce the revocation confirmation
signatures σra1 and σ
ra
2 . σ
ra
1 is a deterministic signature that
is linkable with σ1 confirming the revocation is designated for
this vehicle. Then, σra2 is a signed commitment to confirm
that the pseudonym was revoked. As a consequence of σra
being produced, the TC deletes all pseudonyms and its DAA
key pair sktc/pktc. The TC responds to the vehicle with the
revocation confirmation σrvk, which is then sent to the RA.
Upon reception of the revocation confirmation, the RA verifies
that σra1 is the same signature as σ1 from the pseudonym
certificate implying that the correct vehicle has revoked itself.
The entire signature σrvk can be verified using DAAVerify as
being signed by the TC that belongs to the misbehaving vehicle.
By the end of this protocol, there are strong guarantees that
the vehicle in question has been revoked without the need of
any pseudonym resolution. The RA has verifiable evidence,
from the vehicle, that it has performed the revocation enforced
by the TC. In the event of a vehicle revocation, it has to re-run
the JOIN protocol before being able to re-join the ITS and
acquire new credentials.
VI. SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we discuss the proposed DAA-based solution
with respect to the achieved security and privacy properties. We
consider the following roles within the scope of our analysis
to be Vehicles (Users is also considered here), TCs, Verifiers,
Issuer and RA.
A. Threat and Adversary Model
Vehicular Communication systems are susceptible to both
outsider and insider adversaries [9] [33]. The former are
unauthorized entities (i.e., no credentials or trust relationships
with other system entities) that seek to compromise the system
and disrupt its operation. In contrast, the primary goal of
an insider attacker would be to intercept, block or modify
network communications or impersonate a legitimate vehicle
(Sybil attack [34]). Assuming that it is impractical to break
the cryptographic protocols, the remaining attack vector would
be to try and obtain a vehicle’s DAA credentials in order to
perform a malicious action. An adversary armed with such
credentials may also try to extract the identity of the host
vehicle. For instance, signatures produced by the compromised
DAA credentials could be used to track the vehicle, thus,
breaching its privacy, unlinkability and untraceability.
Furthermore, in our context, we are also considering Honest-
But-Curious (HBC) [12] adversaries who represent legitimate
participants (i.e., infrastructure entities and/or vehicles). Their
goal is not to disrupt the functionality of the network but to
breach a vehicle’s privacy. The HBC does not deviate from
the defined protocol rules but possibly learns information from
legitimate message exchange and information monitoring.
B. Security Analysis
The security assurances rest on the TCs within the vehicles
to provide the security guarantees, in particular their possession
of an endorsement key embedded at manufacture which only a
genuine TC can have. We consider the following key properties.
User-controlled anonymity: The identity of a vehicle (user),
using the credentials provided by the CREATE protocol, is
not disclosed unless this is dictated by the vehicle itself.
In particular, the credentials do not contain any personal
identifying information. The signing key of the TC is not
linked to the vehicle, and it is certified blindly by the Issuer.
Extracting to whom the pseudonym corresponds to is infeasible
because the identity of the TC (and hence that of the vehicle)
is not linked to its signing key.
User-controlled unlinkability: Unlinkability depicts that
linking of subsequent communications (or service requests)
originating from the same vehicle is infeasible. In this context,
if a vehicle wishes for two communications to be unlinkable
then it can do so by using different pseudonyms (hence “user
controlled”). The certificate psCerttc in the two cases cannot
be linked as being associated to the same TC since: (i) the
public key pkps is fresh and could have been generated by any
TC in each case, (ii) the credential ĉre is freshly blinded in
each case, (iii) σ1 by itself is not a verifiable signature, and
does not reveal which sktc was used, or relate to a particular
pktc, and similarly (iv) the signatures in σ2 are blinded.
Non-frameability: This property states that communications
from a vehicle cannot be faked or generated by some attacker
(or even the Issuer) without the involvement of the vehicle’s TC.
This is achieved as any message mplain issued by a vehicle is
signed by the TC in the S IGN/V ERIFY protocol. The signature
on m is assured by the credential cre signed by the Issuer
(together with psCerttc ) and, therefore, it can only be generated
from the associated TC.
Assurance of revocation requests: A TC should only
accept genuine revocation requests so as to ensure that attackers
cannot arbitrarily revoke vehicles. This property is achieved
by including the RA’s signature on any revocation message,
so that it will not be accepted by the TC as a valid revocation
unless the signature is present. Since msg includes the public
key of the pseudonym to be revoked, it cannot be reused by
an attacker to revoke any other pseudonym.
Assurance of revocation confirmation: A key requirement
of the revocation mechanism is to provide strong guarantees that
when an RA has initiated and run the protocol to completion,
then the associated TC must have been involved in the protocol
instance and correctly received the revocation request. It is the
TC, as the trusted platform, who is responsible for deleting the
pseudonym certificates and no longer using them. In particular,
the RA should not reach the point of believing that the
revocation has taken place when in fact the TC is unaware of it.
This assurance is provided by the TC signing the confirmation
against the pseudonym public key pkps whose revocation is
requested, and the RA can verify the TC’s signature on that.
No other party can create this signature, and TC will only
create this confirmation when pkps is being revoked. Hence,
no revocation confirmation can be used by an attacker to spoof
a confirmation of any other revocation request.
Assurance of revocation: If a revocation request reaches
the TC then it will trigger the process of deleting all generated
pseudonym certificates. However, the attacker model also
allows a vehicle to block messages intended for the TC,
including revocation requests (note that this is also an issue
for REWIRE [23] and O-TOKEN [24]). In order for revocation
to take effect in this case, the TC needs to detect that this has
occurred. This can be achieved by a heartbeat mechanism, such
that the TC periodically expects either a revocation message
or a heartbeat (which may be a revocation intended for some
other TC, or else a timed message). Revocation messages
and heartbeats include information about the period they are
intended for, thus, a heartbeat for one period cannot be used at
a different time. They are signed by the RA so they cannot be
tampered with or spoofed, and only one message is generated
by the RA for each time period. Failure to receive a heartbeat
message (or a series of messages so as to allow possible limited
connectivity) can act as indication for potential misbehaviour
that can also trigger revocation by the TC. In order to improve
the safety level provided, this mechanism can make use of the
types of heartbeat messages already provided for monitoring
the status of one-hop vehicular topologies so as to produce
indistinguishable communications and diminish the revocation
vulnerability window existing in conventional CRLs [11].
These security arguments with respect to the required
properties will benefit from formal modelling and analysis.
Work is currently underway formulating the protocols in the
TAMARIN protocol verification tool [35], in which properties
can be captured as lemmas on the model. Furthermore, a full
blown implementation and evaluation of the system is ongoing
to demonstrate its efficiency, practicality and scalability. Various
properties are of interest with a particular focus on pseudonym
generation, revocation and network latency; the latter can
be induced by vehicular mobility so as to better assess the
revocation protocol under volatile network connectivity. The
goal is to provide strong evidence on the efficient provision of
security-related services in vehicular networking environments
against existing architectures [9] [36].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented our novel (distributed) DAA
pseudonym framework for VC, which provides a comprehen-
sive set of security, privacy and accountability services to
V2X systems. Leveraging widely accepted trusted computing
technologies, our solution caters to the needs of vehicular
users while overcoming the limitations of existing VPKIs.
However, there are still a number of questions to be answered
since the adoption of such a (distributed) secure and privacy-
preserving architecture, based on trusted computing, is not
straightforward. For instance, what operational functions is
it reasonable to place within the “trusted world” of a TC
without compromising the overall performance? The same
question can be reversed for the context of the “untrusted
world” provided by a host: what types of services can be
placed in this model without compromising the overall security
and privacy? These are interesting challenges for future work,
where implementation and experimentation will be performed
to evaluate the feasibility of the DAA solution, and identify a
TC capable of performing the required functionality.
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